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Recent Cases
investors. Following this trend, the
court found that the investors bore
the risk of loss, thus negating the
need to proceed to the second step of
the Democratic test.
Therefore, the court rejected the
APCC's challenge to the book
valuation method for the same reason
it accepted the BOCs' challenge to
the FCC's fair market method: the
shareholder bore the risk of loss so
the shareholder should reap the
benefits. Finally, the court rejected
the APCC argument that the FCC
required a transfer of pay-phone
assets from regulated to unregulated
books, stating that the Order instead
only required that pay-phone assets
not be accounted in separate affili-
ates.
In sum, the court sought to
preserve the legislative intent of the
Act while abiding by the express
language of § 276. It interpreted the
legislative intent to be the promotion
of fair competition within the area of
pay-phone service while it adhered to
the language of providing PSPs with
fair compensation for each call they
serviced. In accordance with these
goals, the court remanded the issues
of: (1) the interim and permanent
rates for access code and 800 calls;
(2) requiring only large IXCs to pay
full compensation in the first interim
year; (3) failing to provide interim
compensation for 0+ and inmate
calls; and (4) assigning fair market
value for pay-phone assets trans-
ferred from BOCs to separate
affiliates.
Credit Reporting Agencies Have a Duty to Go Beyond
Original Sources When Reinvestigating
Credit Report Inaccuracies
By Andrew Geier
In Cushman v. Trans Union
Corp., 115 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 1997),
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed and
remanded the district court's judg-
ment that, as a matter of law, Trans
Union Corporation ('TUC") met its
obligations under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA") when it
relied solely on the creditors' original
information in determining the
accuracy of a consumer's credit
information. The court held that the
FCRA requires a credit reporting
agency to go beyond its original
sources of credit information when
reinvestigating inaccuracies in a
credit report after the consumer
informs the agency of those inaccura-
cies.
Credit Cards Falsely Obtained
Jennifer Cushman ("Cushman")
was a college student in Vermont in
the summer of 1993 when an
unknown person applied for and
obtained credit cards in her name
from American Express ("Amex"),
Citibank Visa ("Citibank"), and
Chase Manhattan Bank ("Chase").
This person obtained the credit cards
by providing the credit grantors with
Cushman's name, address, social
security number, and other identify-
ing information. Cushman was
unaware of the existence of these
cards until the following year when a
bill collector informed her that TUC
had published a credit report showing
that she was delinquent in her
payments on the cards. By that time,
the unknown person had accumulated
charges of approximately $2,400
between the three cards.
Cushman informed TUC that she
had neither applied for, nor used, the
cards and suggested that someone
had fraudulently obtained them. TUC
responded by contacting Amex and
Chase to determine whether
Cushman's verifying information
(such as her name and social security
number) in TUC's report matched the
information that they had. Amex and
Chase confirmed that their informa-
tion was the same. Additionally, TUC
discovered that Cushman had not
opened a fraud investigation with the
credit grantors. Since she had not
begun a fraud investigation and the
verifying information matched, TUC
left the information on Cushman's
credit report. However, since TUC
was unable to contact Citibank, it
deleted the Citibank delinquencies
from the report.
TUC sent Cushman an updated
copy of the report containing the
Amex and Chase delinquencies.
Upon receiving the report, Cushman
wrote a letter to TUC contesting the
delinquencies still contained in the
report and offered to sign affidavits
explaining that these delinquencies
were not hers. In response to the
letter, TUC performed a reinvestiga-
tion that was identical to its first
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investigation. However, TUC did not
change the content of the report
because Amex and Chase recon-
firmed the verifying information. In
addition, in April of 1995, TUC was
able to contact Citibank regarding the
contested delinquencies and
Citibank's information matched
TUC's. TUC then reinserted the
Citibank delinquency into
Cushman's credit report and notified
Cushman of the reinsertion.
The following September,
Cushman disputed the delinquencies
directly with the credit grantors,
Amex, Citibank, and Chase. She
provided each creditor grantor with a
handwriting sample for them to
compare to the signature on the credit
card application. All three credit
grantors decided that the cards had
been fraudulently obtained. TUC
subsequently deleted the negative
information concerning the three
credit grantors from Cushman's
report. Regardless, Cushman brought
suit against TUC alleging negligent
and willful failure to reinvestigate the
disputed delinquencies in her credit
report. She alleged violations of the
Vermont Fair Credit Reporting Act
("VFCRA"), VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. §
2480a, FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§
1681i(a), 1681n, 1681o, and defama-
tion. TUC moved for summary
judgment on these claims, but the
district court denied its motion. After
the close of Cushman's case, the
court granted judgment to TUC as a
matter of law for each claim, and
Cushman appealed to the Third
Circuit.
Cushman's Claim Under § 1681i(a)
of the FCRA Was Valid
FCRA § 168 li(a) provides that if
a consumer disputes the accuracy of
an item in her file, and she informs
the credit reporting agency of that
dispute, then the consumer reporting
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agency must reinvestigate the
disputed information unless it has a
reason to believe that the dispute is
frivolous or irrelevant. If a credit
reporting agency violates § 168 li(a),
the consumer may have a private right
of action for negligent and willful
noncompliance under §§ 1681n and
168 lo, and may be allowed to recover
actual damages, attorney's fees, costs,
and if the noncompliance is found to
be willful, punitive damages.
TUC contended that Cushman did
not have a private right of action
under §§ 1681n or 1681o because
she did not have a valid claim under §
168 li(a). TUC claimed that her only
available relief was under §§
168 li(b) and (c). These sections
provide that, if a dispute is not
resolved under § 168 li(a), a con-
sumer can submit a statement
describing the dispute which the
credit reporting agency must include
in the consumer's credit report. In
reversing the district court, the court
of appeals rejected TUC's claim that
Cushman had no available relief
under § 168 1i(a) stating that §§
168 li(b) and (c) presume that a
reasonable reinvestigation had been
conducted but that the dispute had
not been resolved. Cushman, the
court noted, alleged that a reasonable
reinvestigation had not taken place at
all. The court explained that a
consumer who alleges that no
reasonable reinvestigation has
occurred has a separate claim under §
168 li(a). Consequently, the appellate
court found that Cushman had a valid
claim for negligent and willful failure
to reinvestigate.
Court Considered Claim for
Negligent Failure to Reinvestigate
Having decided that Cushman had
a valid claim under § 168 1i(a), the
court turned to the issues of TUC's
obligations under that section and
Cushman's burden of proving TUC's
negligent noncompliance. The court
of appeals again reversed the district
court by rejecting TUC's contention
that § 168 li(a) requires a reporting
agency to do more than confirm the
accuracy of the disputed information
with the credit grantors who were the
original sources of the information.
In rejecting this contention, the court
relied on decisions from the Seventh
and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal.
The Seventh Circuit held that a
credit reporting agency that has been
informed of a potentially inaccurate
consumer's credit report is different
from one that has not received notice.
See Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29
F.3d 280, 286-287 (7th Cir. 1994). If
the credit reporting agency is notified
of a potential inaccuracy, it should
conduct a thorough investigation.
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit
held that in a reinvestigation of the
accuracy of credit reports pursuant to
§ 168 li(a), a credit reporting agency
must bear some responsibility for
evaluating the accuracy of the
information obtained. See Stevenson
v. TRW Inc., 987 F.2d 288 (5th Cir.
1993). The Third Circuit noted that
the Stevenson court rejected the exact
argument made by TUC that a
consumer must resolve the dispute
with the creditor. The court agreed
that the burden to reinvestigate is
upon the credit reporting agency, not
the consumer.
The court stated that a credit
reporting agency does not have to
investigate beyond the original source
of a consumer's credit information
when there is no indication that there
may be an inaccuracy in the report.
The cost of requiring an agency to do
more would outweigh the potential
benefits. However, once an agency is
informed about a potential inaccu-
racy, a more thorough investigation is
appropriate because the agency only
incurs the cost of reinvestigating one
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piece of disputed information. The
court reasoned that since credit
reporting agencies reap the benefits
of collecting and disseminating
consumer credit information, they
should also bear the responsibility of
ensuring the accuracy of that
information. This responsibility,
which is imposed on credit agencies
by § 168 li(a), requires a reinvestiga-
tion that does more than shift the
burden back on the consumer to
dispute inaccuracies with the credit
grantors.
The court cited two factors that
determine the credit reporting
agency's duty to go beyond
the original source of the
credit information. The first
factor is whether the
consumer has alerted the Un
agency that the source may rs
be unreliable, or if the
agency itself knows or
should know that the per
source is unreliable. The
second factor to consider is
the cost of verifying the was
accuracy of the source
compared to the possible
harm the inaccurate
information may cause the
consumer. The court stated
that these factors are to be considered
by the finder of fact.
Looking at the facts in the record,
the court found that a reasonable jury
could have rendered a verdict for
Cushman. The court stated that ajury
could find that TUC should have
known that the credit grantors were
unreliable to the extent that they had
not been informed by Cushman of the
possibility of fraud. Further, based on
the fact that TUC pays investigators
$7.50 per hour and expects them to
conduct ten investigations per hour, a
jury could also find that seventy-five
cents per investigation was too little
for TUC to spend when compared
with Cushman's possible damages.
Consequently, the court reversed and
remanded the district court's grant of
summary judgment with respect to
Cushman's claim for negligent
noncompliance with § 168 1i(a).
Claim for Willful Failure to
Reinvestigate Remanded
In addition to her claim for
negligent noncompliance under §
168 li(a), Cushman claimed willful
noncompliance under that section
and sought punitive damages under §
168 1n. To prove willful noncompli-
ance, the court stated that Cushman
must Copoeirtat pays adote
hito codttninvestigationplckowg
tativoed egts guraintedto
consmer un r he CRA ortati
to itfrTUC atte in rekesds e d
whehe itsmpoicy wiolted [thoe
!LghtsI _ _ ____
thesse ol pobe damages .'de
mstincoe ther itrict Cr hadope
itsrnuedstgatiCumn plic knoin
thaoinolae rit §g16araee itodi
nconsmrsder hther sheA that w
TUC' acdiance disregardllful
wth couts poictvated thsed
ighs I Cuha col prv oeo
mStiproe the thact TUGr hadope
rights. Cushman houd provenot
even made a case for negligent
noncompliance with § 168 1i(a), it did
not consider whether she had shown
TUC's noncompliance to be willful.
The court stated that it believed
Cushman had produced sufficient
evidence to allow a reasonable jury to
conclude that TUC's noncompliance
was willful. Since the district court
was more familiar with the factual
issues involved in the case, the court
remanded this claim to the district
court for further consideration.
Cushman Claimed Violations of the
VFCRA
In determining whether Cushman
was entitled to the protections of the
VFCRA, the court had to determine
whether she resided in Vermont. The
court relied on the definition of
"residing" provided in Vt. Stat. Ann.
Tit. 9, § 2480a(l). This
section defines "residing"
as living in a particular
area, but not necessarily as
having the intent to make
that area a permanent
home. The court stated
that Cushman had lived in
t~ Vermont throughout most
n1 of the period of her
dispute with TUC. This
provided a sufficient basis
for ajury to consider
whether Cushman had
"resided" in Vermont for
purposes of determining
the applicability of the
VFCRA protections.
Having determined that Cushman
might be eligible for the VFCRA
protections, the court considered her
claim that TUC violated the Vermont
statute by not promptly notifying her
of the reinsertion of the Citibank
delinquency on her credit report. See
VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 9, § 2480d(f). A
TUC employee testified at trial that
TUC notified Cushman of the
reinsertion through her attorneys.
However, Cushman argued that this
notification took place during
discovery so the notification was not
sufficiently prompt as required under
the statute. The court stated that it
was unable to consider Cushman's
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claim because the record did not
reflect when her attorneys received
the notification from TUC. Therefore,
the court reversed and remanded this
issue to the district court.
Cushman next claimed that, under
the VFCRA, TUC did not provide her
with a description of its reinvestigation
procedures as required by Vt. Stat.
Ann. Tit. 9 § 2480d(g)(5). The court
found that the evidence in the record
supported Cushman's claim and ruled
that this claim should stand.
Court Remanded Defamation Claim
Cushman's final claim against
TUC was a state law claim for
defamation. The district court had
dismissed this claim because
Cushman had not produced the
required evidence of malice, and
because the FCRA preempted her
state law claim for defamation except
where "malice with willful intent to
injure" is proven. 15 U.S.C. §
1681 h(e). The court stated that the
district court failed to address this
issue. Accordingly, the court re-
manded Cushman's defamation
claim, reasoning that, since it had
remanded the issue of whether
Cushman was entitled to punitive
damages for her claim of willful
noncompliance with § 168 li(a), it
would also remand this issue to the
district court to make another finding
of "willfulness" with respect to her
defamation claim.
Finally, the court considered the
district court's alternate basis of
dismissal of Cushman's defamation
claim. The district court had dis-
missed Cushman's defamation claim
on the alternate basis that she had not
produced any evidence of publica-
tion. The court used the law of the
forum state, Pennsylvania, when
considering this issue because
neither party had argued that
Vermont law applied. Under
Pennsylvania law, a claim for
defamation must be supported by
evidence that the information was
communicated to at least one person
other than the person defamed.
Disagreeing with the district court,
the appellate court determined that a
jury could find that the information
had been published for two reasons.
First, a TUC employee testified at
trial that the allegedly defamatory
information was communicated to
Citibank and Chase. Second,
Cushman was originally informed of
the allegedly defamatory informa-
tion through a bill collector and the
jury could find that this information
had been published to him. Conse-
quently, the court also reversed and
remanded the district court's
alternate ruling on Cushman's
defamation claim. I
PPO Did Not Violate Antitrust Laws by Canceling
Contract with Area Hospital
By Thomas O'Connor
In Doctor's Hospital of Jefferson,
Inc. v. Southeast MedicalAlliance,
Inc., 123 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 1997),
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a
district court decision granting the
motion for summary judgment made
by Defendant preferred provider
organization ("PPO"), Southwest
Medical Alliance, Inc. ("SMA"), and
Defendant hospital, Jefferson Parish
Hospital Service District No. 2 ("East
Jefferson"). Plaintiff, Doctor's
Hospital of Jefferson, Inc. ("DIJ"),
claimed that Defendants violated 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-2 of the Sherman Act
when SMA accepted East Jefferson
into its PPO and contemporaneously
dropped DHJ from its PPO. The
district court granted the motion after
finding that Plaintiff did not have
proper standing to bring an antitrust
suit; the appellate court affirmed, but
on alternate grounds. The appellate
court found that although Plaintiff
had standing to bring an antitrust
claim by alleging that Defendants had
injured Plaintiff's position in the
marketplace, Plaintiff was unable to
show that it suffered an antitrust
injury, and therefore summary
judgment was proper.
East Jefferson Joined SMA, and
DHJ's Membership Was
Simultaneously Terminated
DHJ and East Jefferson are
located next door to each other in
suburban New Orleans and shared a
number of the same doctors. East
Jefferson was the more established of
the two hospitals as it opened in
1968, 16 years earlier than DHJ, and
had more than four times the bed
space of DHJ. In 1988, DHJ and a
number of other hospitals established
SMA, a not-for-profit PPO. SMA
was organized by dividing its member
hospitals into two tiers: (1) member
hospitals which receive seats on
SMA's board of directors and (2)
hospitals on contract to provide
services which retain no ownership of
SMA. At the time SMA was estab-
lished, DIJ began in the more
prestigious of the two tiers, as a
member hospital. However by 1991,
after briefly dropping out of SMA,
DHJ was reaffiliated as a member in
the second tier.
As the number of patients served
by SMA and the revenues earned by
SMA members grew, DHJ attempted
to get back into the potentially more
profitable first tier. However, SMA
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